The Constitutional Court is not an accessory body; it is the ultimate guarantor of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. It holds the responsibility of curbing potential excesses of political power and safeguarding the fundamental principles of the democratic rule of law. The Constitution requires a two-thirds qualified majority to elect its judges, a mechanism designed to ensure balance, compromise, and a sense of responsibility. With the need to elect new judges, the PSD faces a decision that goes far beyond parliamentary arithmetic. It is a question of with whom they wish to build that qualified majority and, above all, at what cost. Establishing agreements with a political force that has repeatedly questioned the fundamental pillars of the Constitution and the democratic regime cannot be treated as a simple exercise in viability. Regardless of the individual in question, being nominated by the far-right does not inspire confidence. There is no rule that mandates agreements with the second-largest party in parliament; that idea is as convenient as it is false. Other majorities are possible, starting with the second most-voted political force (PS). Ignoring this is not an inevitability, it is a choice. The Constitutional Court relies on its credibility, and the mere suspicion of ideological capture weakens it. Ultimately, the question is whether we are willing to protect the Constitution with consistency or if we accept relativizing it for political convenience.