Constitutional monarchy is not, by definition, a step backwards. On the contrary, it is a model where the head of state operates within legal limits, in a system where effective political power belongs to elected institutions. In several European democracies, the monarch acts as an institutional arbiter and symbol of continuity, separate from partisan disputes. This separation is an advantage: a non-elected but politically neutral head of state can reinforce stability and reduce the personalization of power. Furthermore, the predictability of succession eliminates electoral disputes for the head of state, allowing political debate to focus on the government and Parliament. Implementing a constitutional monarchy in Portugal in a democratic way is currently impossible. Not for lack of arguments, but due to constitutional imposition. The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic enshrines in Article 1 that 'Portugal is a sovereign Republic', symbolically closing the door to any alternative. More than that, Article 288, paragraph b), prevents revisions that alter the 'republican form of government', turning a political option into an untouchable clause. In other words: the Constitution not only defines the regime, it shields it against the popular will. In a system that claims to be democratic, this rigidity raises an obvious contradiction. Even the use of a referendum is conditioned. Article 115 excludes matters that imply constitutional revision, which, in practice, prevents consulting citizens on the very form of the State. Thus, the people can express their opinion on almost everything, except on the regime in which they live. If constitutional monarchy can offer advantages such as institutional stability, neutrality of the head of state, and a clearer separation between State and government, this should be a matter of free debate, not legal prohibition. When there is so much talk about revising the Constitution, taking this topic seriously requires courage: revising Article 1, eliminating the rigid definition of the regime; amending Article 288 to remove the absolute character of the republican form; and reformulating Article 115, allowing referendums on structural issues. It is not about defending the monarchy. It is about questioning a more fundamental principle: can a democracy prevent its citizens from choosing their own regime? If the answer is 'yes', then the problem is not the monarchy, it is the Portuguese democracy itself. Taking this debate seriously requires, first and foremost, a constitutional revision that eliminates or makes this material limit more flexible. Not to impose a change, but to allow for a choice. A mature democracy does not fear structural questions, it institutionalizes them. Discussing the monarchy is not returning to the past. It is testing the coherence of the democratic present.