Parliament today approved in general the government's proposed criminal policy law for the 2025-2027 biennium and rejected the PCP's bill that would have assigned the definition of this policy to the Public Prosecutor's Office and the police.
If the deadlines set in the current Framework Law had been observed, the criminal policy law for 2025-2027 would have come into effect on 1 September 2025. However, due to reasons largely stemming from the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic (AR), the Government has recently prepared a bill that defines the objectives, priorities, and guidelines of criminal policy 'for the biennium of 2025-2007', with discussions and voting expected soon. Regardless of the judgment made about the innovations introduced in the proposal, it is a positive fact: it represents compliance with an imperative that, among other things, realises the constitutional aim of a Public Ministry (MP) participating in the execution of the criminal policy defined by sovereign bodies. In many democracies, it is the governments that set priorities in this matter. In our case, it is the Parliament that is responsible, every two years, for defining them based on the government proposal. The law is used for this purpose, thus enabling a more immediate control of any potential unconstitutionality. Voices were raised in 2006 against the innovation, considering it harmful to the constitutional autonomy of the MP: unfounded, as has been proven over two decades. Some consequences arise from this option, not always well understood or taken seriously. One of the most notable is the requirement - not coincidentally directly guaranteed in the Framework Law, rather than left to parliamentary rules and practices - that the Assembly, prior to the discussion and voting of the criminal policy law for the biennium, must hear the Attorney General (PGR). Given the importance of the MP's role in executing criminal policy and its constitutional conception as a hierarchical magistracy, it would be expected - and in light of other experiences - that this parliamentary hearing would be of special relevance. Surprisingly, the evolution observed has not been in that direction. Furthermore, for the approval of a law of this nature, it is easy to understand the importance, for Parliament, of evaluating the execution of previous laws by the MP. In a logic of accountability, which was intended to be directly reported to Parliament, the PGR is legally bound to present to the AR, within a set timeframe, a 'report on the execution of criminal policy laws regarding inquiries and preventive actions within the competence of the MP' (which includes, it should be added, the so-called 'preventive investigations'). In this regard, the use of parliamentary hearings of the PGR for clarification is also expressly provided for. However, in this area, so relevant when the AR discusses a new law, there is no news of compliance with the set deadline, nor, much less, of the deputies resorting to the hearing that the Framework Law assures them. Not due to a lack of norms, but despite them, there is a deficit that has accumulated in the relationship between Parliament and the PGR - worsening in the last year and a half - and a path that has not been taken, which would be fruitful for our institutions. A proposal for a criminal policy law always constitutes an opportunity for a shift.